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knowledge. Is this faith in literature's instructive power justified, or does this talk of insight perpetuate a misleading mirage? Does anything dis tinguish such knowledge, if it is one? Is it possible to strip away the liter ary dressing from what is credited as knowledge, or is the "medium" somehow necessary, and if so, why? Any examination of the relations between philosophy and literature requires facing these familiar ques tions. If the above literary excerpt informs, there must be something in the lines, in the configuration of the words, in the arrangement of the im ages, or the imagined or perceived vocalization of them, which is doing important and mysterious epistemic work.
Five features are needed for the epistemic (knowledge-yielding) linking of philosophy and literature. 1 A complete account regarding literature's contributions to knowledge needs to: (I) elucidate how a literary work can support a general claim; (II) show what is uniquely gained by con centrating on such support-patterns as they appear in aesthetic contexts in particular; (III) clarify whether and how features of aesthetic response are connected with knowledge; (IV) maintain a distinction between ma nipulation and adequate persuasion; (V) achieve I-IV without ending up with what David Novitz has called "a shamelessly functional and didac tic view of literature." I shall postpone discussion of the connections be tween literature, epistemology, and morality until the next chapter.
Literary Language and Literary Experience
Many theories explain the ways by which literature yields knowledge. Some say that literature enables forming hypotheses, thereby creating 1 I will not deal with conceptualizations of the philosophy/literature links that do not appeal to the knowledge-yielding aspect of literary works. I am thinking here mainly of de construction (which by virtue of dropping altogether the philosophy/literature distinction in favor of an all-embracing textuality, makes it impossible to investigate the relationships between philosophy and literature), but also of suggestions regarding noncognitive contri butions of literature to philosophy, such as that of Cora Diamond, according to which phi losophy should not be conducted as an investigation, but should rather be "an imaginative response to life" (1993, pp. 144-45) . Stanley Cavell's readings of Shakespeare are in part motivated by the idea that turning existential concerns into epistemological problems is it self a form of evasion (e.g., 1987, p. 179 ) that philosophy has repeatedly indulged in. Cavell is focusing on skepticism, and it is difficult to know whether he means this claim to have a broader scope. I agree with Cavell that epistemological concerns do not exhaust the thoughts, anxieties, and sentiments triggered by weighty philosophical issues. But this can not mean that the move to epistemology is itself wrong, unimportant, or forms an evasion.
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beliefs-albeit not necessarily justified ones. 2 Others argue that reading a literary work creates coherence in our beliefs by revealing possible discrep ancies between our general convictions and detailed contexts. 3 A third view is that a literary work can advance knowledge by functioning like an example 4 or a prolonged thought-experiment 5 in which conceptual insights are gained through engaging with the rich and complex contexts of lifelike occurrences. Others maintain that literature establishes knowledge not of the actual but of the possible. 6 For the purpose of investigating the rele vance of literature to philosophy such suggestions cannot suffice. At best, such accounts will show philosophers that rigorous philosophical reflec tion requires examples, thought-experiments, or a delineation of the possi ble, not that it needs literature. In order to convince philosophers that they need "literary" examples, or "literary" thought-experiments, it is neces sary to delineate an epistemological gain stemming either from features pe culiar to literary language or from the experience that literature creates.
The first option, appealing to aspects particular to literary language for the purpose of advancing knowledge, will fail. Oppositions that were em ployed in the past to articulate the distinctiveness of literary discourse (figurative/literal, particular/general, emotions/thoughts) are no longer generally accepted. One cannot then claim that emotional appeals, partic ular descriptions, or figurative constructions make for distinct, irre ducible, and nonparaphrasable forms of knowing. A further obstacle is that, again, all these aspects are not essentially related to literature. An elaborate case for the importance of figurative language, for example, will merely succeed in proving to philosophers that they require figurative statements, not the rich, involving experience of the literary work. 7 This 2 For variations of this idea, see Beardsley (1958, pp. 429-30) , Hospers (1960 , p. 45), Mew (1973 ), McCormick (1983 ), Novitz (1987 , pp. 131-32), and Putnam (1976 . 3 Richard Rorty (1985) links literature and knowledge through coherence, as do David Novitz (1987, p. 135) , Nussbaum (1990, p. 389), and Diamond (1993, esp. p. 151) . 4 For different variations of literature as example or counterexample, see Sirridge (1975 ), Pollard (1977 , Nussbaum (1986, p. 32; 1990, pp. 45-49, 87-93) , Eldridge (1989, pp. 19-21), and Carroll (1998, pp. 142-46) .
5 Zemach (1997, pp. 198-200) . 6 This idea does not begin with the various contemporary counterfactual accounts of lit erature but rather goes back to Aristotle's Poetics, ch. 9. For some other modern examples, see D. Walsh (1943 ), H. Putnam (1976 , and some of T. S. Eliot's ideas in "Poetry and Pro paganda."
7 Such an account may, however, be incorporated into the analysis of the existence of "literary aspects" of philosophy-that is, when a philosopher employs such means, this might suggest that he has reached the limits of philosophical discourse. The neo-Platonic 5 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
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rather underrated objection is also fatal to other suggestions as to how and why literature is philosophically relevant. Consider the suggestion that literature formulates in words what has hitherto been unexpressed or not fully described. Poetic articulation can thereby form or re-form a philosophical position. 8 But descriptions of this sort require nothing as intense as involvement with literature. Citing or paraphrasing the appro priate sentences is enough. Appeals to literature's particularity lead to the same objection. 9 Particular descriptions presuppose general assumptions. A uniquely particular mode of thought is thus an illusion. Besides that, particularity is not unique to literature.
Literary experience is our second option. Colin Falck writes that litera ture operates through tapping into "preconscious moods," thereby cir cumventing a more aware experience. Martha Nussbaum characterizes literary experience as one in which certain emotions are drawn out, emo tions that constitute specific beliefs that cannot otherwise surface. 10 Ne oromantic accounts of reading experience stress the role of the imagina tion in belief formation. If the imagination plays a constitutive role in belief formation, we need to involve ourselves with the imaginative realm (literature). 11 Empathic beliefs are another popular suggestion: literary reading experiences involve knowledge of what it will be like to "live through" the situation portrayed. Shared by all these suggestions is the tradition of interpreting Plato's myths as expressing the ineffable is a well-known example. See also De Man's (1978) Taylor, 27 February 1818 , in D. Bush, ed. (1959 .
9 Phillips (1982 , p. 29), Diamond (1993 , Eldridge (1989, p. 4, 19-21) , and Nussbaum (1990, pp. 37-40) all appeal to literature's focus on particulars and aim to con nect this with knowledge. In Shakespeare criticism, this idea goes back to Richard G. Moulton's The Moral System of Shakespeare: A Popular Illustration of Fiction as the Ex perimental Side of Philosophy (1903) . 10 Falck (1989, pp. 56-59) ; Nussbaum (1990, pp. 40-42, 282) ; for another formulation of emotional knowledge, see Reid's (1961) development of the idea of "cognitive feeling."
11 Novitz (1987) and Falck (1989) both attempt to defend reformulations of romantic epistemologies along these lines by stressing the imaginative. On the cognitive relevancy of the imagination, see also Nussbaum (1990, pp. 75-82) and Currie (1998).
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Qualitative uniqueness, however, cannot suffice. Claims do not turn into justified beliefs merely by being contemplated in an involved and emotionally attuned state. Powerful discovery never constitutes justifica tion. 12 The same holds for empathy. Knowing what it can be like to have a particular belief or what can make someone have that belief is not a justification for the belief itself. In fact, a recurring objection to claims on behalf of literature's moral import highlights the threat that empathy poses to a just moral assessment-the danger of developing a selective sense of justice. 13 Empathic knowledge thus seems helpful only if litera ture's contribution to knowledge resides in the insights gained from it re garding processes of belief formation. But if justified beliefs are being sought, being empathic or nonempathic to the positions discussed is clearly insufficient.
Qualitatively oriented explanations, therefore, all relate to types of be lief formation, to the unique ways in which literature creates beliefs, not to the assessment of those beliefs (whether or not these are the beliefs one ought to have). Formation and assessment of beliefs can be com bined, and Nussbaum attempts to integrate them by asserting that some beliefs could not be assessed at all if one did not employ emotional, em pathic, or imaginative processes that enable one to form them in the first place. Nussbaum's integration of formation and assessment is sound, but can be synthesized into a broader account, which I will now outline.
Literary Arguments
I propose a conception of rational justification that can accommodate the idea of literature as knowledge yielding. I begin with theories of argu mentation that employ more than deductive or inductive inference pat terns as rational means of establishing propositions. Aristotle's account of examples and enthymemes in his Rhetoric remains the fountainhead for such theories (although the idea is older). Aristotle argued that in some domains, what we take to be a credible source of knowledge is the reap plying of a principle that was successfully applied in another known case.
12 Along these lines is Hilary Putnam's (1976) partial rejection of the idea of knowledge through literature. 13 For such criticism, see Posner (1997) and Statman (2002) .
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Examples of this kind do not make for inductive inferences, but only for a "kind of induction" (I.ii.13). 14 The notion of induction does not include learning from the local incidents that make up our lives and from which we reasonably establish many of our attitudes. Learning in such ways is a noninductive yet rational reapplication of a principle that emerged in a similar context. The principle in question is not a categorical "For all cases of type X, Y is the case" but is a particular affirmative or negative judgment of the form: "For some cases of X, Y is the case". 15 At first, employing Aristotle's analysis in the context of the philosophy-literature question seems to simply lead back to the idea mentioned earlier: a view of the process of learning from fictional hap penings as analogous to that of learning from examples. But Aristotle's rhetorical analysis allows for relocating the literature-as-example idea from being only a suggestion linking aesthetics with cognition to an ar gumentational move justified through rhetorical theory. This is not a ter minological shift. Such relocation explains not only the plausibility of the move from one case to the other but also delineates the contingent logical status of some of the philosophical beliefs with which literature deals. For Aristotle, the need for rhetoric arises when discussing assump tions and beliefs that can be other than they are-claims that can be de rived from premises that are usually not necessary but are "for the most part only generally true" (I.ii.14). Aristotle was of the opinion that most of our judgments are of such a contingent nature.
Placing literary examples, thought-experiments, arguments by anal ogy, or coherence-establishing mechanisms within the framework of a rhetorical theory of rationality makes it possible to deal with objections regarding the nonvalid nature of such kinds of argumentation. Drawing 14 Readers of Nussbaum's account of Aristotelian practical reasoning (1990 , pp. 54-106), or Stuart Hampshire's (1983 , could easily see how the following sketch of Aristotle's rhetorical views could be neatly integrated with his ideas concerning ethical method. I shall later specify some of the gains of adding the rhetorical emphasis in relation to the philosophy-literature question. 15 The distinction between particular and categorical propositions, coupled with the claim that literary examples support the former, strikes me as a more defendable position than the abductive/paraductive distinction employed by Warner (1989, pp. 345-54) in or der to legitimate the inference from examples. Moving from "case to case," as paraductive reasoning supposes, cannot really circumvent assuming the existence of a mediating partic ular judgment that legitimates such reasoning. Peirceian abduction is one way in which such a particular statement can be grounded, but it is not the only route of this kind [Ab duction is the idea that P is observed, but if Q was true, P would be a matter of course: ergo, there is reason to believe that Q].
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an inference from an example is not valid in the traditional sense: the im possibility of accepting a conjunction of the premises coupled with a negation of the conclusion. 16 Accepting the need for nonvalid yet ra tional argumentation of this kind stems from the recognition that many of the beliefs relevant to philosophical reasoning are, for the most part, contingent. Identifying justification with logical necessity is an obvious fallacy. But when this mistake is recognized, the question then becomes how to argue for claims that are contingent in the sense of an inability to derive them formally or necessarily from other assumptions. Establish ing nonarbitrary first truths leads to the same problem. 17 Opting to choose argumentational principles that cannot accommodate such be liefs is to endorse a limited mode of philosophizing. Broadening the in tellectual range to which philosophical methodology should be sensitive involves accepting means of argumentation that do not conclusively demonstrate a claim, but rather make it plausible, by supporting it to a certain degree. The connections surveyed above, which link the literary context and the beliefs it supports through identifying it with an exam ple, with a delineation of the possible, etc., are such means. 18 Locating these moves within the context of a modern reconstruction of rhetorical theory or some other approach of informal reasoning en ables the normative argument on behalf of literary belief formation to emerge: if we wish to sustain the belief that some domains of human ex perience can be rationally discussed and understood, and if we drop the idea that rationality in these domains can always take the shape of valid reasoning, then we should accept as sound (though not as conclusive proof ) the patterns of nondeductive reasoning that close engagement with literature can suggest. Forgoing the demand for validity need not 16 There are also no inductive relationships between a statement of the type "Prince Mishkin brings out the best in those around him" and the general statement "Seeing the best in others brings out the best in them." Novitz (1980) tried to defend a version of such inductivism, but later abandoned it (1987). I shall not repeat the arguments against such implication. For these, see especially Sirridge (1975) and McCormick (1983) . 17 Aristotle sees the need for nonvalid practical reasoning regarding first-truths in his ethical work (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 75) . The idea that philosophy needs literature for estab lishing first-truths has been suggested by Jesse Kalin (1976), most explicitly in his (1978) .
18 Some (e.g., Mason, 1989 , or Warner, 1989 would perhaps go further, saying that most of philosophy is like that anyway and that when one is cured of the illusion of quasigeometrical reasoning one is able to see just how frequently philosophical moves are actu ally rhetorical. I think we can have a more discriminating view, one that accommodates the possibility for rigorous arguments and yet sees these as a very limited sphere within the philosophical domain.
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imply dismissing rationality. As long as we maintain the identification of argumentation with a set of legitimate means for making beliefs plausi ble (rather than means for conclusive proof ), literature can well be a form of argument. And since "rhetoric" does not here merely denote belief-formation but is a framework for the justification of beliefs, the beliefs that emerge are candidates for what one ought to accept. "Candi dates" is my preferred term, since being presented with a good argument-literary or nonliterary-does not automatically guarantee actual acceptance. That can only emerge after considering other, possibly opposing, good arguments. 19 Linking philosophy and literature is thus not some closed endpoint but rather a method, a mode of philosophizing not necessarily limited to moral questions but potentially applicable whenever contingent claims or first truths need to be supported. Such broadening of the scope of linking philosophy and literature is one advantage of basing the concep tion not only on Aristotle's ethical writings, emphasized in Martha Nuss baum's neo-Aristotelian conceptualization, but also on his rhetoric. We can delineate four other gains. First, such a framework makes it possi ble to recognize that the patterns of argumentation so far suggested in the literature-examples, analogies, thought-experiments-are mostly nonvalid moves in the traditional sense. Second, it is possible to justify such moves as part of a theory of rationality. Third, recognizing the na ture of the beliefs discussed in this way means that the claims in ques tion are either contingent or first truths, or relate to some other content that can only be given limited support. Finally, we can specify an impor tant limitation of this sort of inquiry: it is not philosophically justified when nonrhetorical means are available. 20
19 Jonathan Kertzer's Poetic Argument (1989) is one attempt to identify literature with argument. But Kertzer's suggestion avoids the question of normative vs. descriptive beliefformation that is so crucial for philosophical application, as does Zahava Karl McKeon's Novels and Arguments (1982) , which also employs a notion of argument that encompasses any communicative act (pp. 24-25) . A beginning along the lines above can be found in Martin Warner's essay "Literature, Truth, and Logic" (1999), which continues important earlier work of his on the ideal of geometrical reasoning within philosophy (in his Philo sophical Finesse, 1989) . The most elaborate position regarding the rhetorical interconnec tions between logos and pathos within the context of literature is that of Wayne Booth (both in Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent and in The Company We Keep).
20 These remarks do not exhaust the differences between Nussbaum's approach and the one developed here. I discuss the difficulties I see in Nussbaum's position in detail in my forthcoming essay, "Literature as Aristotelian Moral Philosophy," to be published in a vol ume devoted to Martha Nussbaum in The Library of Living Philosophers series.
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The Epistemological Role(s) of Literary Experiences
Yet it is possible to engage in rational nonvalid argument in numerous non literary ways. So far, the need for such argumentation merely shows that philosophers require nondeductive patterns of argument, not literature as such. Tying literature to rhetoric in this way explains the links between philosophical readings of literary works and legitimate belief assessment. The aesthetic context itself is still an unnecessary addition. How, then, does the experience of literature in particular add to the nonvalid yet rational move that is being made when we are learning from a literary text?
The answer to this has two dimensions. The simpler of these involves the contribution of the suggestive capacities of literature. 21 "Literary argumentation" is not merely legitimate nonvalid reasoning but, rather, reasoning conducted in a state of mind-which reading literature itself creates-in which contingent claims and nonvalid moves can be sympa thetically entertained. Suspending disbelief (which is one aspect of the state of mind that good literature sometimes creates) can help us bridge (or ignore) the gap between justification and the nonnecessary conclu sion we are expected to draw. Claims about love or parenting, presented later in this book, do not lend themselves to rigorous justification. Avoiding such domains is surely an option, while philosophizing about them invites suggestiveness. Proposing this is not dangerous, since advo cating suggestiveness is not the same as introducing manipulation into philosophy. On its own, an involved, responsive state is neither rational nor irrational. Although it can function as illegitimate, manipulative brainwashing, it can also manifest a rational willingness to reconfigure perception so that contingent insights can be contemplated. The ques tion of whether a specific process is one or the other cannot be decided without examining the specific context. Sifting such appeals to context will be taken up in the next chapter. 22 21 Yehoshua (2001) recently talks of the suggestive capacities of literature (though the older reference to the "willing suspension of disbelief " may already be alluding to litera ture's suasive abilities). The idea can be tracked back to Plato's attack on the poets. 22 There are various restrictions that can be applied so that "the appeal to context" does not preempt the approach into one that cannot distinguish between appeals to context that should be accepted and those that are to be rejected. More than an issue of setting criteria of relevance that could function as a normative guide to successful sifting of appeals to con text, the broader problem is how to devise an error theory for reasoning not predicated on validity but on the particular coordinates of the situation. Only an error theory could 11 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
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But experience in general, and the experience of reading literature in particular, is connected with knowledge in deeper ways than that. Expe rience is unique in that there is an irreducible gap between what we ex perience and what we manage to communicate through a description of that experience. Many ordinary examples verify this (e.g., trying to de scribe a majestic landscape to someone who has not seen it). The inde scribable, nonparaphrasable aspect is a form of knowing ("You have to see it to know what I am talking about"). This kind of gap or demand for actually experiencing something does not exist in the case of argumenta tional justification: if I grasp an argument, there is nothing additional I need to do in order to know what is being communicated. Literature cre ates experiences that empower and support particular beliefs, and the de tails and variations of this process will be shown later in the readings.
"Support" requires explication. Literary experiences do not constitute reasons for accepting certain implications, as false beliefs can be embed ded in very powerful reading experiences. But literary experiences do have a positive (though not indefeasible) connection with knowledge. I will now characterize this positive connection in four ways. First, to miss such experiences while contemplating some beliefs can itself be a form of error. Returning to the example of natural scenery, think of an obtuse entrepreneur who, on the basis of the repeated testimony of others, gen uinely believes that a certain landscape is beautiful and awe inspiring, yet follows a course of action that destroys it. Indifference to beauty can surely be at work. There may also be other overriding reasons against preserving the landscape. But sometimes one suspects a more cognitive error: a lack of understanding that could not be remedied by being ex posed to more propositions, but might be corrected by being exposed to the beauty of the landscape. Some will maintain that this experience con stitutes a reason to avoid destroying the landscape. I have no quarrel with that, since this already discloses an outlook that respects experi ences as distinct anchors of knowledge. My grounds for avoiding calling this experience a "reason" is my desire to accommodate a deeper episte mological function that is at work here. For even if our environmentally obtuse person holds to the same propositional content before and after he was exposed to the landscape (and in this sense he did not acquire a new "reason" against destroying the landscape), there may still be a postulate a meaningful difference between reasoning and rational reasoning that I take to be a defining distinction of philosophical method and of a credible notion of philosophical argumentation. The issue is taken up in the next chapter.
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Missing certain experiences can lead to or itself be a form of error or misunderstanding. This is the first characterization of the positive con nection between experience and knowledge. A second way to character ize this linkage is to specify various changes in what the entrepreneur would now say or do in order to explain the different kinds of knowing. Knowledge is sometimes reducible to actual or potential behavior. Thus, conduct that has changed does not merely describe manifestations of knowledge, but modifications in the knowledge itself. 23 The third charac terization of the epistemic difference that results from the experience of seeing the landscape is metaphorical: the entrepreneur now knows the same content in a "deeper" or more "powerful" or "vivid" way. Disap pointing as such metaphors are, they are still informative and inescapable when one tries to characterize the intrinsic dimension of transformations in epistemic 'leveling,' to use another metaphor. Powerful and deep con veying of false beliefs is a possibility that complicates matters. But this danger does not alter the positive contribution such depth makes to the epistemic status of justified beliefs. There is nothing incoherent about a property that can entrench false beliefs and also deepen justified ones. Fourth, such experiences can be thought of as enabling conditions. Light, for example, enables clear vision, even though it is not itself a reason for believing anything particular about what is seen. Many things can still go wrong after one turns on a light. Enabling conditions promote knowl edge, but do not thereby constitute reasons.
"Emotional involvement," "empathic involvement," "enhanced percep tiveness of the particular," "conveying" as opposed to "describing," "showing" as opposed to "telling"-such constructions and oppositions that explain the unique sort of communication and intellectual experi ence that some literature enables are all informative. But they are also far too general, and can therefore be used only as terms that signify rich domains that need to be carefully charted. 24 If one wants a general term 23 I disagree with those who believe that all knowledge is reducible to behavior. But I see no substantial argument between my position and that which subscribes to the more ex treme view. 24 The formulation of the describing/conveying opposition in Shakespearean commen tary goes back at least to William Richardson in A Philosophical Analysis and Illustration of Some of Shakespeare's Remarkable Characters (London, 1774; rpt. New York, 1966) . The telling/showing opposition along with the preference for the latter is explicit in The Rape of Lucrece: "To see sad sights moves more than hear them told, / For then the eye 13 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
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here, "experience" is the least misleading and the one that focuses most clearly on the important aspect they all share: the describable and at the same time nonparaphrasable component that is being related to knowledge.
If my goal here was to present a theory of literature, it would have been necessary now to inquire what distinguishes the experiences litera ture provides from other experiences (and, more specifically, whether anything distinguishes literary experiences from other aesthetic experi ences). I would also have to argue against those who reject the idea of aesthetic experience, claiming that no successful demarcation exists be tween these experiences and others. Important as such questions are, pursuing them for our concerns is not mandatory and is probably detri mental, as saying anything more specific about literature here would only pare down the possible consensus. Even if "aesthetic experience" is a myth, and nothing distinguishes literary from nonliterary experiences, this does not prevent regarding the knowledge that literature yields as a form of experiential knowing.
The structuralization of Knowledge
My argument so far is this: if the literary text and its reading are persuasive, a claim is not only communicated but also justified. Rhetorical, invalid ra tional reasoning and the role of experience form the two constituents of such justification. These constituents interlock: invalid-yet-rational reason ing is embedded within an experience, an experience that both accommo dates the move psychologically and supports the belief epistemically by be coming what may be called a "ground" for it. This does not imply that upon reading the work one also immediately accepts what it may "ar gue" for. Even in conventional philosophy the existence of a justification does not entail acceptance. 25 Justification-turning a claim into a truth claim, a candidate for truth-differs from verification-accepting a claim interprets to the ear / The heavy motion that it doth behold . . ." (lines 1324-26). John Roe (in The New Cambridge Shakespeare edition of The Poems [Cambridge, 1992] , p. 206) re lates these lines to Sidney and follows Malone in tracing the tradition of preferring the vi sual back to Horace's Art of Poetry.
25 Lamarque and Olsen draw a relevant distinction here, in claiming that "thematic statements . . . can be assigned significance and thus be understood without being con strued as asserted" (1994, p. 328, 384). 14 as true-and it is the former process that literature facilitates. At the same time, if nonliterary evidence and counterarguments to the "literary argu ment" have been assessed and found to be corroborating the truth claim being advanced, the (mere) truth-claim can turn into a justified true belief.
These then, are the steps leading from literature to truth and knowl edge. But since virtually all work on literature and philosophy (this book included) deals with moral philosophy rather than other branches of philosophy, "justification," as I have been unpacking it, should be un derstood as being broader in application than just relating to truth. "Truth" is a rather strained and usually redundant notion within ethics. Truth enters ethics when assessing the morally relevant facts (obvious as well as tacit facts). But the moral reasoning conducted in relation to these facts is typically not assessed in terms of it being true or false. Con sequentialism, for instance, is not assessed as a true or a false theory in ethics, but as being plausible or implausible, comprehensive or limited, workable or superficial, etc. We justify certain moral outlooks, and this implies that there is something that we wish to get right, but the moral stance we accept does not become true. Rather, we adopt a moral stance because it makes sense/ is rewarding/ is conducive to happiness/ accom modates general fairness/ encapsulates sensitivities we care about-it is under one of these senses (or something like them) in which we take a moral stance to be "right." And so literary justification, while it may lead to truth as I have been arguing above, is primarily attuned to differ ent modes of acceptance of the plausibility of claims.
Literary works make plausible certain beliefs and also support them through the experiences they create. In focusing on such moments, the following readings in this book unfold a multilayered concept of under standing. Charting various interrelations between beliefs and the carefully constructed experiences in which these are embedded exposes modalities of philosophical understanding and philosophical insight. I speak of philosophical understanding and insight, as the beliefs and the processes of belief-formation I shall be dealing with all relate to general and defin ing aspects of life and to living a life well.
Epistemological cartography of this sort makes for this book's metaphilosophical argument: particularizing epistemological processes into numerous relationships between complex experiences and specific claims-more specifically: connecting particular projections, expectations, blind spots, points of alienation, moments of involved attentiveness, apor ias, and dismissals, with the claims specific readers make in such contexts, suggests a conception of human understanding. This conception can be 15 an alternative to the one presupposed in most current Anglo-American philosophizing, in which truth claims and argumentation are all that matter. 26 The alternative could show that contemporary philosophical method is not only stylistically dry-and, it is important to note, "dryness" can be merely a "stylistic" fault only relative to a certain, no doubt dominant, conception of understanding and philosophical communication-but it presupposes a misguided view concerning human understanding and what it should ideally include. Human understanding, when functioning at its best, is not limited to accepting only what can be conclusively verified empirically or deductively. It also embraces sugges tive processes that embed contingent beliefs in experiences that give them sharpness and force. But if this is so, then philosophy as it is practiced, taught, and published in some quarters perpetuates a misconception as to the nature of rationality.
A philosophical reading of literature has an epistemological basis in two ways: in being knowledge yielding, and in being itself an inquiry into the structuralization of knowledge. By "structuralization" I refer to the manner by which the same propositional content can be entertained on different levels. Epistemic structuralization also presupposes a differ ence between knowing and not knowing (as well as a manner of error) that does not consist in the beliefs entertained but rather depends on un dergoing (or missing) certain experiences. It is in this sense that the rela tions between philosophy and literature are epistemological rather than moral: it is less the moral (paraphrasable) content being justified, and more the manner of contemplation, support, and acceptance of this con tent that constitute literature's unique contributions to philosophical re flection. And so, while the following readings will deal with attitudes and problems typically classified as moral, my primary concern is with the experience in which moral content is embedded; the argumentative move that underlies this experience and supports a moral claim; the 26 The contemporary state of philosophy sometimes masks the fact that many philoso phers have rejected the idea that only arguments matter. For connections between style and implicit epistemology in Plato, see my "The Face of Truth" (1999); for such connections in Nietzsche, see my "Seeing Truths" (1998) . The same connections between epistemological and rhetorical concerns also animate therapeutic visions of philosophy. I am thinking here of the way in which arguments are subordinated to ethical therapeutic goals in Hellenistic thought as shown in Nussbaum (1994) . The medical analogy, so central to Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics, implies that, just like a physician in relation to a patient's body, philosophers must always note the makeup of the recipient's mind rather than limit them selves to cerebral discourse.
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Since these literary experiences can be described (though not para phrased), I am not now attempting to resurrect discredited modes of pri vate knowing. At the same time, the emphasis on a process one has to undergo personally does diverge from the linkage between public verifica tion and knowledge, a linking that is such a dominant strand of modernist epistemology. In the next chapter, I will suggest what went wrong in the modern account of rationality, specifically in its rejection of rhetoric.
Method
Talk of experience brings up questions of method. How do we find out what these experiences are? The following readings will deal with this difficulty in various ways. One possibility is to note the mode in which a literary work operates on the reader (in this case, me). For example, in the essay on Macbeth, I argue that the play creates a growing discon nection from the valueless world of its hero, while establishing a prefer ence for values that other characters exhibit. I allude to other inter preters who responded similarly to the work (though repeatability is not necessary). Another way is to note the work's effect on another in terpreter. Here, for example, is Wilson Knight writing on Julius Caesar: "There is an almost brutal enjoyment evident in our imagery of slaugh ter, wounds, and blood: yet is it so flamed with imagination's joy that there is no sense of disgust." 27 Knight is telling us how some aspect of that play makes him feel. Some may object that such methods are subjec tive. But interpretations are not only "reports" of experiences-though they can be partly that too. In the context of interpretive discourse, Knight's use of "our" is never simply descriptive. If Knight supposed that the highly complex reaction he is describing is what we feel anyway, it makes no sense for him to argue for it or for us to read his interpreta tion. Interpretive remarks such as Knight's or mine are rather sugges tions as to how one should relate to a text in the most fruitful way. This is why the subjective nature of such remarks is unimportant: since inter pretations are invitations to structure one's experience in a certain way 27 The Imperial Theme, Methuen & Co., London, 1945, p. 45. 17 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
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(rather than descriptions of experiences the work universally creates), it hardly matters that the interpreter is the only person who has, up to this point, reacted to the work in such a way. Invitations are never evaluated in terms of being subjective or not, but according to whether or not they lead to a worthwhile way to spend one's time. Whatever constitutes a worthwhile interpretation-that is, a fruitful mode of relating to a work-is a complicated issue involving many considerations. But subjec tivity is not one of them, and so that worry can be laid to rest (though this way of thinking about interpretation also shows why interpreters should avoid producing invitations that no one else can accept). 28 To return to my main point, while interpretive discourse regarding aesthetic experiences is never simply descriptive, interpreters making such remarks as to their own responses are still committed to the idea that the text has created such experiences in them. For example, it would count against Knight's interpretation if it were revealed that he himself never really felt the sort of "brutal enjoyment" he is describing. Inter preters can surely misdescribe their experiences, and this complicates matters. But the fact that interpreters can be wrong about these experi ences does not prevent the possibility of them being right about them. By appealing to vulnerable observations of reading experiences, or by pre ferring one set of observations to another, a philosophical use of litera ture is not worse off than a scientist appealing to what she sees, or a his torian relying on firsthand reports of some events rather than others, or a judge putting his trust in one testimony over another. I will also add that experiences need not be ones in which beliefs are simply created, but may also involve missing certain connections. The chapter on Romeo and Juliet discusses the significance of readers forgetting (and in terpreters dismissing the fact) that Romeo is in love with another woman at the beginning of the play.
Philosophical Criticism and Didactic Criticism
The centrality of experience enables literature to be philosophically relevant without being instrumentalized-a threat that has led to 28 While I do not mean to compare this to other suggestions within reader-response the ory, readers may wish to read this method against other modes of analyzing response in Shakespeare, such as that of E.A.J. Honigmann (1976) , who tries to avoid subjectivism by noting the way Shakespeare attempts to create specific responses.
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controversies over endangering the autonomy of art by turning literature into a form of moral philosophy. 29 Philosophers of literature need not em ploy a didactic concept of literature (though, in the context of early mod ern literature, it has often been suggested-e.g., by Dickey, 1966, pp. 12-19 -that avoiding the didactic dimension of texts is itself a vulgariza tion of them). We read literature much for the same reason that we en gage in art in general: it provides us with unique experiences that can be described but never fully conveyed through paraphrase. Some of these ex periences can and should be investigated as part of the sort of descriptive epistemology I outlined above. Such investigation does not instrumental ize literature. Rather, it is an inquiry into what makes our experiences with literature unique. And this can be done, I will try to show, without postulating a generalized notion of aesthetic experience or harping too much on its conventional constituents (beauty or disinterest). Instead, it can be done by concentrating on particular experiences with powerful lit erary moments and the way these interrelate with specific beliefs.
❏
We now have our five-stage explanation. A fictional context provides knowledge through argumentational routes that several theorists have proposed. My addition to existing suggestions was to incorporate them into a broad context of rational justification. Theorists have delineated several unique aspects of aesthetic response. My proposed contribution to these suggestions was to connect them with the state in which contin gent claims and first truths need to be contemplated, and to add the con nections between such experiences and knowledge. Finally, inquiring into the ways claims emerge as part of an aesthetic response does not in strumentalize aesthetic creations. Rather, such investigation is an inquiry into our unique reactions to literature.
29 Novitz (1987, p. 12) , perhaps because he wants to allow literature to be knowledge yielding, finds it necessary to argue against aesthetically oriented views of literature. As does Nussbaum (1998) in her reply to Richard Posner (1997, 1998) , who criticized her ap proach as involving such an instrumentalization of literature. On the issue of instrumental ization, see too the exchange between Wayne C. Booth and Richard Posner in Philosophy and Literature (1998), as well as Booth's contribution to ethical criticism in the special is sue of Style (1998) devoted to the morality-literature connections, as well as The Company we Keep. 19
